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Abstract: United States firms in the early 20th century were subject to
public and private regulation. Forms of regulation included rate regu-
lation and stock exchange listing requirements. These regulations cre-
ated incentives to report income statement information. This study
utilizes the 1915 Moody’s Analyses of Investments to test whether
regulated firms in the United States reported more income statement
information than unregulated firms. Rate regulation influenced utili-
ties to report income statements more frequently than industrial com-
panies. Stock market listing requirements also influenced the report-
ing of income statements. Therefore, the results indicate that both
public and private regulations influenced financial reporting in the
early 20th century. Another finding of the study is that income state-
ments were more frequently reported than balance sheets for both
railroads and utilities.
INTRODUCTION
The importance of income statement versus balance sheet
information has increased over time. A major shift from the
balance sheet to the income statement occurred during the 20th
century as the income statement began to be used to assess the
ability of a firm to generate wealth [Buckmaster and Jones,
1997; Jones and Aiken, 1994]. The need for financial reporting
may be better understood by investigating the causes of this
shift in emphasis.
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In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the balance sheet
was dominant because it provided information on the steward-
ship function of management and information about capital
[Gilman, 1939]. These were important issues for early investors
in stocks. They wanted a secure investment. Banks also sought
information on collateral for loans [Corcell, 1989]. As the fi-
nancing needs of corporations grew and reliance on equity is-
sues for capital increased, the income statement grew in impor-
tance.
Competitive factors were significant in limiting operating
and profit information. Profitable industries did not want to
attract competitors or cause labor to demand higher wages
[Michael, 1996]. Few details about income components were
reported [Lee, 1979; Morris, 1984; Baldwin et al, 1992]. The
‘British Secretive Model’ with minimal disclosure and a balance
sheet focus has been used to describe reporting at the turn of
the 20th century in the United States [Michael, 1996].
In the 1870s, the public and other businesses were unhappy
about what was perceived as excessively high fares by U. S.
railroads [Ulen, 1980; Trebing, 1984]. The debate that grew out
of these concerns resulted in railroad and utility regulation. The
1890s also saw the growth of individuals investing in stocks and
the rise of organized U. S. stock exchanges to facilitate these
investments [Navin and Sears, 1955; Bryer, 1993]. These ex-
changes then reacted to investor information needs and created
listing requirements to regulate the information that listed com-
panies had to provide investors [Sivakumar and Waymire, 1993;
Normand and Wootton, 2001; Gross, 2002]. U.S. legislation was
also passed to regulate the disclosures of listed companies
[Previts and Bricker, 1994].
This paper examines the role that these forms of public and
private regulation in the United States had on the amount and
content of income statement and balance sheet disclosure for
railroad, utility, and industrial companies. The study empirically
tests whether these regulated industries provided more frequent
income statements and greater amounts of income statement
disclosures, looking at rate regulation and stock market listing
requirements as separate types of regulation. The disclosure of
revenue by rate-regulated industries is also examined. The paper
examines whether regulation created pressure to disclose more
income statement information. The current accounting history
literature indicates that the income statement was not a promi-
nent nor consistently provided statement in the U.S. until the
1920s. This study will add to the debate about when the income
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statement became prominent and the factors that influenced its
rise to prominence and usefulness. Therefore, the role that regu-
lation played in the shifting focus from the balance sheet to the
income statement orientation is examined.
United States company reports in the 1915 Moody’s Analyses
of Investments are used to determine if income statements were
more commonly provided and/or were more detailed for regu-
lated versus unregulated companies. Moody [1915] reported the
information that was made public by companies followed by his
investment service. This public information was used to rate the
bonds and stocks of companies for investment quality. Moody’s
reported on a large number of firms. The company reports are
examined in this paper to determine whether an income state-
ment and balance sheet were provided. Statistical tests are uti-
lized to verify relationships. Large samples also enhance
generalizability of the results. This empirical approach extends
the literature base by using another methodology to examine the
issue of the importance and prominence of income reporting.
Different methodological approaches which find similar results
make those conclusions more credible. Conversely, the use of
alternative methodologies can often lead to different conclu-
sions.
The results for rate regulation indicate that utilities were
more likely to provide an income statement than industrial com-
panies. The utility income statements were also significantly
more detailed than the industrial statements. No significant dif-
ferences were found for frequency or detail of income state-
ments for railroads versus industrials or railroads versus utili-
ties. Furthermore, while almost all railroad and utility income
statements disclosed revenues, less than half of the industrials
examined that provided an income statement reported revenue.
Industrial companies were more likely to disclose a balance
sheet than railroads or utilities. The industrial balance sheets
were also significantly more detailed than those disclosed by
railroads and utilities. Thus, rate regulation was shown to be a
significant catalyst to the preparation and publication of an in-
come statement, calling into question the conclusion of the pre-
dominantly descriptive literature that the income statement did
not become prominent in the U.S. for another decade.
Stock market regulation (listing requirements) also influ-
enced the likelihood of reporting an income statement. Compa-
nies listed on a stock exchange were more likely to report an
income statement than unlisted companies. The detail of the
income statement was shown to be greater for listed companies
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as well. The results also indicate that listed companies are more
likely to report a balance sheet and the balance sheet of listed
companies is more detailed than those of unlisted companies.
The results concerning the regulatory influence of listing re-
quirements thus shows that they increased disclosure of both
statements.
The next section of the paper discusses regulation as it af-
fected income statement disclosure and develops hypotheses.
The succeeding section discusses the data and methodology
used to conduct the empirical tests. This is followed by a discus-
sion of the results, summary and conclusion.
REGULATORY EFFECT ON INCOME STATEMENT
DISCLOSURE
This study considers rate regulation for railroads and utili-
ties and stock market listing requirements as external factors
that influenced company reporting decisions. Both factors are
referred to as regulations, but only rate regulation is a true regu-
lation in the sense of being imposed by law. Stock market listing
requirements are a form of self regulation that companies sub-
scribe to on achieving stock exchange listing. Table 1 provides a
summary of the various statutory rate regulations and New York
Stock Exchange (NYSE) requirements, the dates they became
effective, and the companies that were covered by the regula-
tion.
Rate Regulation of Railroads and Utilities: Trebing [1984] defines
economic regulation as control over prices and earnings and the
restriction of entry/exit by enterprises within regulated markets.
In the late 19th century, there were public outcries for economic
regulation of railroads and utilities in the U.S. [Ulen, 1980]. A
number of mid-west states passed the Grange Laws in the 1870s.
These laws gave states the ability to regulate railroad rates. The
rates were based on return on invested capital assets
[Boockholdt, 1978]. The United States Supreme Court upheld
the power of states to regulate prices of firms that possessed the
economic power to exploit customers in Munn vs. Illinois [1877]
[Trebing, 1984]. As a result, both railroads and public utilities
became regulated industries.
Boockholdt [1978] notes that the use of these return on
invested capital rate setting regulations coincides in time with
the increased use of the retirement method of depreciation and
a trend toward capitalizing rather than expensing new assets.
While he did not empirically test this relationship, the correla-
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TABLE 1
Regulatory Requirements to 1915
Regulation Type of Company Applied To
Rate Regulation:
1837 Virginia Law required railroads Virginia Railroads
to submit annual report to state
disclosing amount of stock, revenue,
and profit/loss
1870s Grange Laws allowed state rate Railroads operating mostly in mid-
setting, most based on return on assets west
Interstate Commerce Commission Railroads that transacted
(ICC), 1887 established system for using interstate commerce
accounting data to regulate rates
Railroad Regulation Bill, 1905 Wisconsin railroads
developed an accounting rate of return
to ensure fair return and fair rates
Hepburn Act, 1906 empowered the ICC Railroad that transacted
to establish uniform chart of accounts interstate commerce
Public Utility Law, 1907 allowed rates Wisconsin utilities
based on cost plus fair return
1909 ICC prescribed form of balance Railroads that transacted
sheet for railroads interstate commerce
Mann-Elkins Act, 1910 empowered ICC Railroads that transacted
to regulate railroads based on interstate commerce
accounting rate of return
Various state laws created rate Railroads and utilities operating
regulation of railroads and within state borders
utilities by 1913
New York Stock Exchange Listing
Requirements:
1866 created Committee on Stock
List to create stock listing requirements
1869 required issuers to provide annual All listed companies
financial report, to register shares in
New York City, and use transfer agents
1895 recommended annual balance All listed companies
sheet and income statement
1900 required balance sheet and Newly listed companies only
income statement
1910 required interim reports, All listed companies
balance sheet audits, and disclosure
of all material information
Moody’s Rating Requirement:
1909 required an income statement All companies included
to receive a rating
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tion between a regulatory change and a change in accounting
policies seems to have clearly existed. This change in accounting
policies was such that it would tend to increase rates. This
shows that rate regulation influenced accounting policy choice.
These early regulations did not solve the discontent over
rates so further rate legislation was introduced. The Interstate
Commerce Commission (ICC) was established in 1887. Henry
Carter Adams, the ICC’s first statistician, devised an accounting
system that served as a basis for examining revenues, expenses,
and earnings of railroads and utilities so that fair rates could be
established [Trebing, 1984]. The significance of this regulation
for this study is that it used data from the income statement to
help establish rates.
Regulation grew with the Populist/Progressive Reform Party
movement from 1877-1920 [Trebing, 1984]. Governor LaFollette
of Wisconsin (a Progressive Party member) and John Commons
of the institutional school of economics at the University of Wis-
consin were instrumental in the development of economic regu-
lation. The goal of the Progressive Party was to bring about a
rational deployment of public resources based on ‘reasonable
value’ and ‘rate of return’ [Covaleski et al, 1995]. Under
LaFollette, Wisconsin enacted the Railroad Regulation Bill,
1905, which established the Railroad Commission. The Commis-
sion developed an ‘accounting rate of return’ to regulate rail-
roads to ensure a ‘fair’ return and ‘fair’ rates. In 1907, Wisconsin
enacted the Public Utility Law where utility rates were to be
based on cost plus ‘fair’ return [Covaleski et al, 1995].
In 1907, Commons wrote Report to the National Civic Fed-
eration, which explored many fundamental regulatory issues.
This report led to accounting rate of return based regulation
laws in at least 29 states and the Federal government by 1913
[Trebing, 1984]. Federal legislation in the form of the Hepburn
Act, 1906 empowered the ICC to establish a uniform chart of
accounts for railroads. This would lead to more standardized
reporting to aid in rate setting [Boockholdt, 1978]. Subse-
quently, the Mann-Elkins Act, 1910 empowered the ICC to effec-
tively regulate railroads based on accounting rates of return
[Covaleski et al, 1995]. Regulatory pressures continued through
1917 when Federal attentions turned to war issues [Boockholdt,
1978].
The railroad and utility regulation of the early decades of
the 20th century was focused primarily on rate regulation. It
required entities to produce an income statement and share this
with regulators. These regulations did not require companies to
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provide this information to the general public; but with rates
being based on costs, the information contained in the income
statement could be inferred. Therefore, the utilities and rail-
roads did not have a competitive reason to keep the income
statement information secret. The ‘British Secretive Model’ of
reporting was no longer useful within the regulatory environ-
ment faced by these companies [Michael, 1996].
Boockholdt [1978] implies that the early rate regulation in-
fluenced accounting policy choice. It is contended here that
early 20th century regulation would have a similar effect on
disclosure. Because these regulatory acts required charts of ac-
counts (Hepburn Act, 1906) and formats for the balance sheet
and income statement (Interstate Commerce Commission,
1909), standardized accounting by railroads resulted. These
statements were then used by the companies to attract investors.
State laws by 1913 similarly regulated utilities. It is con-
tended that the similarity in regulation between railroads and
utilities would result in similar pressures on disclosure so that
utilities would also report income statements.
Industrial corporations did not face any disclosure regula-
tion other than that imposed by stock exchange listing require-
ments during the early 20th century [Sivakumar and Waymire,
1993]. As a result, these companies were still highly concerned
with the competitive issues of disclosure and, therefore, would
still operate under the ‘British Secretive Model’ of reporting,
which limited disclosure. The lack of rate regulation and its
influence on disclosures for industrial companies would result
in industrial companies reporting income statements less fre-
quently than railroads and utilities since railroads and utilities
faced the rate regulation pressures to prepare and disclose in-
come statements. Based on the existence of rate regulation for
railroads and utilities and lack thereof for industrial companies,
the following hypothesis states:
H1: Rate-regulated companies were more likely to dis-
close an income statement than industrial companies.
Stock Market Listing Requirements: As the economy grew, com-
panies had a greater need for venture capital [Corcell, 1989].
These funds needed to come from investors. Railroads were the
first companies to rely on outside investors. After 1850, rail-
roads in the U.S. needed investors to provide means to acquire
major fixed assets to operate [Boockholdt, 1978]. The growth of
the railroads at this time made them a reasonable investment
for small investors. However, other more risky companies also
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needed capital to grow. Small investors were uncertain about
these companies. While railroads sold at seven to ten times
earnings, industrials sold at three times earnings. However by
the 1880s, railroads had matured so the need for more capital
had declined [Navin and Sears, 1955].
Capitalizing on this situation, professional financiers devel-
oped trusts [Bryer, 1993]. Commencing in 1882, these trusts
allowed investors to rely on and have faith in the investment
banker or firm promoting the trust [Bricker and Chandar, 1998].
Trusts represented both regulated and unregulated industries.
Trading in trusts was significant (150,000 trust shares per week)
and drew attention to industrials as investment opportunities.
Many of these trust companies became corporations or holding
companies in the 1890s. Also, during the 1890s, many mergers
created large companies that imitated the trusts [Navin and
Sears, 1955]. These corporations began trading their shares of
stock, giving small investors the ability to acquire stocks in com-
panies other than railroads [Bryer, 1993].
The growth of interest in owning stocks of individual com-
panies created a need for easy exchange of shares. Organized
exchanges existed earlier, but it was not until later in the 19th
century that a market for industrial securities existed [Navin
and Sears, 1955; Baskin, 1988]. The New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE) established its first listing requirements in 1866. To be
listed on the NYSE, a company had to have a transfer agent,
register their stock in New York City, and provide an annual
financial report [Normand and Wootton, 2001; Gross, 2002].
By 1902, large numbers of corporations (both industrials
and regulated companies) were trading on organized exchanges
leading to diverse ownership [Navin and Sears, 1955]. It was
estimated that in 1899, there were 500,000 shareholders on the
NYSE [Gross, 2002]. To provide for an active market, investors
needed to be comfortable about making purchase decisions.
When trusts and holding companies were common, investors
relied on the investment banker, underwriter, or promoter to
determine the investment quality of the trust or holding com-
pany [Bricker and Chandar, 1998]; but by the turn of the 20th
century, investors were buying individual companies. To make
these purchases, individuals needed more information about the
individual companies or guidance from professionals through
stock ratings. A prerequisite of a thriving, modern equity market
was developed financial reporting to provide the necessary in-
formation for investors to make informed decisions [Baskin,
1988].
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As the stock exchanges grew in importance as a tool to raise
capital, more companies became willing to disclose greater in-
formation and adhere to more stringent listing requirements
(regulations imposed by the stock exchange). In 1895, the NYSE
recommended that all listed companies provide an annual re-
port containing both a balance sheet and an income statement.
Prior to that, only a balance sheet was required. In 1900, newly
listed companies were obliged to issue an annual report contain-
ing a balance sheet and income statement, hold an annual meet-
ing, and distribute proxy statements [Gross, 2002]. In 1910, ad-
ditional listing requirements were introduced for providing
interim reports, restricting the use of certain accounting poli-
cies, requiring balance sheet audits, and requiring the disclosure
of material information [Sivakumar and Waymire, 1993].
Whereas NYSE listed companies were required to provide in-
come statements and significant amounts of disclosure, unlisted
companies were not under the same obligation. In fact, the
NYSE traded unlisted companies. The only disclosure require-
ment for those companies was a balance sheet [Sivakumar and
Waymire, 1993].
Increased information made it possible to analyze compa-
nies for investment purposes, but the average middle-class in-
vestor could not understand the disclosures that were being pro-
vided [Merino and Neimark, 1982]. This situation created the
need for professionals in finance to help investors evaluate the
various investment alternatives [Bryer, 1993].
In the 1890s, analyst services like Poor’s and Moody’s
started to provide published information about companies
[Sivakumar and Waymire, 1993]. John Moody provided analysis
that compared the relative investment quality of various railroad
securities in 1909. These reports included letter rating symbols
for public securities—the first analyst ratings provided to the
U.S. public [Moodys.com, 2001]. The ratings were for railroads
only until 1913 when industrial and utility companies were
added [Moodys.com, 2001]. To receive a rating, Moody required
that the company provide an income statement [Moody, 1915].
A rating was important to attract small investors and was
thus important to companies listed not only on the NYSE, but
on any of the other smaller stock exchanges. The need to attract
investors to acquire investment capital encouraged companies
to seek a stock exchange listing. The listing requirements of
these exchanges became a form of self regulation for listed com-
panies. Because of the increased disclosure requirements of list-
ing and the importance of analysts’ ratings, companies seeking
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investment capital through stock markets would be more likely
to disclose an income statement than unlisted companies.
Therefore, the following hypothesis states:
H2: Stock exchange listed companies were more likely
to disclose an income statement than unlisted compa-
nies.
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
To examine the extent of income statement disclosure by
industrial and rate-regulated companies in the early part of the
20th century, the 1915 Moody’s Analyses of Investments was cho-
sen as the data source. Moody’s was selected because it provides
a broad range of public companies. The 1915 edition was cho-
sen because it was the earliest edition to include a substantial
representation of industrial companies that comprised the non-
rate regulated sample.
The 1915 Moody’s included 5,334 companies. A random
sample of 533 companies was drawn from the manual. From
this sample, companies were eliminated if they did not have
public ownership or were incorporated outside the United
States. A large number of the companies (283 of the sample)
were wholly owned subsidiaries of another company. Five of the
sample companies were foreign. This left a sample of 68 rail-
roads, 85 utilities, and 92 industrial companies. Of these, 68
were listed on an organized exchange and 177 were unlisted.
The pages covering each company were examined to deter-
mine whether an income statement and balance sheet were pro-
vided. To examine the amount of detail provided in the financial
statements, the size of the statements was measured by placing
an overhead transparency on the page that had been sectioned
off into 20 x 25 blocks. The number of blocks that each state-
ment occupied was recorded. Using size as a proxy for extent of
disclosure is a common content analysis technique similar to
that used by Gray et al [1995]. The disclosure of revenue and
whether the stock traded on an organized exchange was also
noted.
Chi-square tests were performed to determine if the fre-
quency of disclosing an income statement or revenue within the
income statement was greater for railroads and utilities com-
pared to industrial companies in order to test the influence of
rate regulation on financial reporting. Chi-square tests were also
used to determine if the frequency of issuing an income state-
ment differed between listed and unlisted companies. The tests
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were also performed on the balance sheet to determine if bal-
ance sheet disclosure was influenced by rate regulation or stock
market listing.
Tests were also performed to determine if rate regulation
and listing requirements influenced the amount of detail in fi-
nancial statement disclosure as measured by the size of the fi-
nancial statements. Because of the large number of companies
not reporting an income statement, the size data was not nor-
mally distributed. Therefore, the Mann-Whitney test was used to
compare the size of the income statement among railroad, util-
ity and industrial companies and listed and unlisted companies.
The Mann-Whitney tests were also conducted on balance sheet
size to examine the influence of rate regulation and stock mar-
ket listing requirements on balance sheet reporting as well.
ANALYSIS OF RESULTS
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the sample. This
table shows that most companies reported some statements.
Only 13.9% of companies failed to provide Moody with any
statements. Just over half (54.7%) of the companies disclosed
both an income statement and a balance sheet. Approximately
80% of the sample reported an income statement. This finding is
inconsistent with the conclusion in the existing literature that
the income statement did not become a consistently reported
item in the U.S. until the 1920s [Skinner, 1987; Buckmaster and
Jones, 1997]. In fact, for the sample as a whole, the income
statement is much more commonly reported than the balance
sheet. The fact that only 60% of the sample reported a balance
sheet is inconsistent with the conclusion in the literature that
almost all U.S. firms published a balance sheet [Brief, 1987].
Railroads were the least likely to report a balance sheet, and
utilities were the most likely to report an income statement.
Rate Regulation of Railroads and Utilities: Revenue was reported
in most railroad and utility income statements. This is probably
an artifact of the Hepburn Act, 1906 which established a uni-
form chart of accounts for railroads. The income statements for
regulated railroad and utility companies were very similar. They
started with revenue and included operating expenses. Some
listed other expense items such as fixed charges, depreciation,
interest, or taxes. Almost all companies disclosed ‘net income’.
The account title given to this number varied among the compa-
nies. (Surplus over charges, balance, surplus, net income, net
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earnings/profit, and total income were among the titles used.)
These statements were clearly recognizable as single-step in-
come statements. The industrial companies were less likely to
report income statements. Less than half of the industrials
which reported income reported revenue. Most industrial in-
come statements did not follow a consistent format across com-
panies. The inclusion of payments to bond sinking funds was
often reported as an expense. Thus, industrial income state-
ments, when provided, were not as well organized or as infor-
mative as the income statements of regulated companies.
The amount of statement coverage varied significantly
among companies within each industry grouping as indicated
by the standard deviation of the areas reported in Table 2. Utili-
ties provided the most detailed income statement disclosures
and the greatest overall Moody’s coverage. Industrials had the
most detailed balance sheets. Consistency in the form and con-
tent of railroad and utility income statements was most striking.
This was certainly a by-product of regulation which required use
of a common chart of accounts (Hepburn Act, 1906) and the
need for regulators to use consistent numbers in rate setting.
The chart of accounts helped standardize income reporting.
To test H1, Chi-square tests were performed to determine if
the frequency of disclosing income significantly varied across
industry groups. When industrials, railroads, and utilities were
TABLE 2
Descriptive Statistics for Sample
Industrials Railroads Utilities Entire
Sample
No statement 12.0% 17.6% 12.9% 13.9%
Income statement 73.9% 82.4% 85.9% 80.4%
Balance sheet 81.5% 36.8% 56.5% 60.4%
Both statements 67.4% 36.8% 55.4% 54.7%
Revenue 32.6% 79.4% 84.7% 63.7%
Mean income statement area 60.68 69.38 78.79 69.38
Standard deviation
income statement area 48.89 47.22 59.79 52.86
Mean balance sheet area 92.98 47.76 71.28 72.90
Standard deviation balance
sheet area 58.65 66.94 75.77 69.44
Mean total area 408.00 478.10 530.02 469.80
Standard deviation total area 204.50 390.64 388.90 335.14
Number of companies 92 68 85 245
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considered together, the Chi-square was not significant (p-value
= 0.12). The industries were then compared individually. The
Chi-square comparing the frequency of income statements for
railroads and industrials was not significant (p-value = 0.206).
Thus, railroads were not more likely than industrials to report
an income statement. Utilities were shown to be significantly
more likely to report an income statement than industrials (p-
value = 0.048). Utilities and railroads did not report income
statements at a different frequency (p-value = 0.551). Thus, H1
was supported with respect to utilities only. Utilities were more
likely to report net income than industrials, but railroads were
not. As Boockholdt [1978] contends in relation to earlier rail-
road regulation and accounting policy choice, these results show
that later rate regulation of utilities provided a catalyst to
change reporting and issue an income statement when a large
number of unregulated companies chose not to report income.
The fact that railroads were not reporting income more fre-
quently than unregulated companies is surprising. The railroads
faced similar rate regulation pressure as the utilities. The exist-
ing literature also contends that railroads were the leaders in
financial reporting [Boockholdt, 1978], but these results indicate
that utilities were more likely to report income.
Table 3 reports the results of the Mann-Whitney tests on the
amount of detail in income statements. The results are the same
as for the analysis of frequency; utilities provided significantly
more income statement disclosures than industrial companies.
Railroads did not provide more disclosure than either industri-
als or utilities. These results show that the income statements
provided by utilities were not only more frequent, but also more
detailed. Railroads did not have more income statement disclo-
sure than industrials. One possible explanation for the finding
that railroads were not reporting income more frequently and
with more detail is the period studied. Many of the railroads in
the sample were inter-urban transit railways. These lines were
already facing pressures from the automobile. As the prospects
of these railways began to decline, the tendency may have been
to reduce disclosure.
The Chi-square and Mann-Whitney tests were conducted to
determine if balance sheet frequency or size varied significantly
among the industries examined and thereby to consider the en-
tire reporting picture. Considering all three industries together,
a significant difference was found for frequency of reporting
balance sheets (p-value = 0.000). Industrials were significantly
more likely to report a balance sheet and railroads were least
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likely. Comparing railroads and industrials showed a significant
difference (p-value = 0.000) with industrials reporting balance
sheets significantly more frequently. Industrials were also more
likely than utilities to disclose a balance sheet (p-value = 0.000).
Utilities were more likely than railroads to disclose a balance
sheet (p-value = 0.015). Thus, industrials were significantly more
likely than railroads or utilities to disclose a balance sheet and
railroads were less likely than industrials or utilities to disclose a
balance sheet. These results on the lack of balance sheet disclo-
sure are interesting when compared to the findings reported in
the extant literature. This literature discusses how common bal-
ance sheets were [Brief, 1987] and how they were the focus of
reporting in the early 20th century [Morrison, 1935; Skinnner,
1987].
The findings reported in this study show that a significant
number of companies that provided income statements did not
provide balance sheets and that this practice was particularly
pronounced in the railroad sector, where regulation may have
directed focus on company evaluation almost entirely on the
income statement. This result again stresses the important im-
pact that regulation had on accounting during this period. At
this time, railroads were also considered to be the leading indus-
try for financial reporting [Boockholdt, 1978]. The results here
seem to indicate that utilities rather than railroads were the
leaders as utilities more often provided a complete set of finan-
cial statements.
Table 4 examines the amount of detail in the balance sheet
using Mann-Whitney tests. These results show that the balance
TABLE 3
Rate Regulation: Total Area of Income Statement
(Mann-Whitney Test)
Industrial vs. Industrial vs. Railroad vs.
Railroads Utility Utility
Industrial median 70 70
Railroad median 72 72
Utility median 76 76
p-value .12 .01** .20
P-values are one-sided for industrial vs. railroad and industrial vs. utility and
two-sided for railroad vs. utility.
** 5% significance
*** 1% significance
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sheets of industrial firms were larger than those of both railroad
and utility firms. The difference in balance sheet size between
railroad and utility companies was insignificant. These results
are generally consistent with those for the frequency of report-
ing for the balance sheet.
TABLE 4
Rate Regulation: Total Area of Balance Sheet
(Mann-Whitney Test)
Industrial vs. Industrial vs. Railroad vs.
Railroads Utility Utility
Industrial median 108 108
Railroad median 0 0
Utility median 76 76
p-value 0.00*** 0.03** 0.07
P-values are two-sided
** 5% significance
*** 1% significance
Chi-square tests were used to examine the reporting of rev-
enue. Considering all types of companies together, significant
differences were found for reporting revenue (p-value = 0.000).
Industrials were less likely than other firms to report revenue.
Comparing railroads and industrials showed that railroads were
significantly more likely to report revenue than industrials (p-
value = 0.000). This result also holds for utilities relative to in-
dustrials (p-value = 0.000). Utilities and railroads were equally
likely to report revenues (p-value = 0.393). Regulated companies
were more likely than industrials to report revenue.
Given the lower frequency of industrials to provide income
statements, this result is not surprising. However, the significant
differences still hold when a subsample of only those companies
reporting an income statement was considered. Industrials were
still significantly less likely than either railroads or utilities to
report revenue (p-value = 0.000 for both).
Overall, these results indicate that rate-regulated compa-
nies, especially utilities, were providing more complete informa-
tion on company performance than industrial companies in
1915. Rate regulation provided incentives to publish income
statements and include more detail within the income state-
ments that were published.
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Stock Market Listing Requirements: Among the sample of compa-
nies selected, trading on an unlisted basis (72.2%) was more
common than being listed (27.8%). A company was considered
to be listed if it traded on any organized exchange. While it is
not known what listing requirements existed for all local ex-
changes, the scrutiny of the listing process is assumed to en-
courage more complete reporting for listed companies regard-
less of the exchange listed on. If exchanges other than the NYSE
did not require income statements, then the inclusion of these
other exchanges as listed securities will only bias against the
hypothesis being found significant. Of the companies in the
sample that were unlisted, 137 disclosed an income statement
and 40 did not. For the listed companies in the sample, 60 dis-
closed income statements and eight did not. To determine if
income statement disclosure was statistically more common for
listed companies (H2), a Chi-square test was performed. The
results indicate that listed companies were more likely to dis-
close an income statement (p-value = 0.028). Thus, the stock
exchange listing requirements were acting as a regulation to
encourage the listed companies to disclose an income statement.
The previous section indicated that rate regulation was an
adequate inducement for utility companies to report income
statements. To determine if stock market listing requirements
encourage all types of companies to disclose income statements,
the Chi-square test was performed on the industrial, railroad,
and utility subsamples separately. Industrials that were listed
were significantly more likely to report an income statement
than unlisted industrials (p-value = 0.002). However, listing sta-
tus did not influence whether railroads (p-value = 0.342) or utili-
ties (p-value 0.378) reported an income statement. These results
indicate that the stock market listing requirement only acted as
a regulatory influence on income statement reporting for those
companies that did not already report income because of rate
regulation. However, for those companies not required by law to
prepare an income statement, the stock market listing require-
ments did act as an adequate incentive to report income. Thus,
those listing requirements regulated the disclosures of compa-
nies seeking to be listed, supporting H2.
Table 5 shows the results of the Mann-Whitney test on the
detail of the income statement for listed and unlisted compa-
nies. The results are similar to those for frequency in that listed
companies reported a more detailed income statement than un-
listed companies. This again indicates the significant influence
that stock market listing requirements had on company disclo-
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sure. The NYSE had a listing requirement about disclosing all
material information, which would be expected to result in
listed companies reporting more information. This was sup-
ported by the results. Also, to get small investors to invest in
their shares, companies needed to provide information for indi-
viduals to make investments decisions.
TABLE 5
Stock Market Listing Requirements: Total Area of
Income Statement (Mann-Whitney Test)
Listed vs Unlisted
Listed median 76
Unlisted median 72
p-value 0.00***
P-value is one-sided.
** 5% significance
*** 1% significance
The frequency of reporting balance sheets and their size
was also examined for listed and unlisted companies. For the
unlisted companies, 89 reported a balance sheet and 88 did not.
Only nine listed companies did not report a balance sheet and
59 listed companies did report a balance sheet. Listed compa-
nies were shown to be significantly more likely to report a bal-
ance sheet (p-value = 0.000) for the Chi-square test. Thus, listing
requirements that required a balance sheet did significantly in-
fluence the disclosure of the statement. To examine whether this
effect occurred for industrials, railroads, and utilities, the chi-
square test was repeated for each industry separately. The re-
sults indicate that for all industries listed companies were more
likely to report a balance sheet (p-value = 0.004 for industrials;
p-value = 0.009 for railroads; p-value = 0.032 for utilities). This
result is very interesting when considered in tandem with the
results from rate regulation. Stock market listing requirements
influenced all types of companies (rate regulated or not) to re-
port a balance sheet, but only influenced non-rate regulated
companies to report an income statement. Rate regulation was
focused on the income statement. Thus, the rate regulation did
not encourage regulated companies to provide a balance sheet.
However, for those rate-regulated companies that chose to be
listed on a stock exchange, the stock exchange listing require-
Accounting Historians Journal, June 200518
ments acted as a regulation to disclose a balance sheet as was
required for listing status.
The size difference for the balance sheet across listed and
unlisted companies was tested with a Mann-Whitney test. The
results are reported in Table 6. Listed companies reported sig-
nificantly more detailed balance sheets than unlisted companies.
Thus, the stock market listing requirements that stipulate the
disclosure of a balance sheet not only encouraged companies to
disclose a balance sheet, they also encouraged a more detailed
balance sheet. This increased level of detail may have resulted
from the listing requirements concerning the disclosure of all
material information that unlisted companies did not have to
satisfy.1
1 The tests reported in this section were repeated using only the 36 NYSE
listed companies in the sample. The results were generally the same for the tests
that could be performed. The only exception occurred with the test for the
importance of listing for industrials to report a balance sheet. NYSE listed in-
dustrial companies were not more likely than other industrial companies to
report a balance sheet, while the body of the paper indicates that listing on any
exchange did create a significant difference with listed companies reporting a
balance sheet more frequently. The paper reports all listed companies because of
the increased power of the test with the larger sample size and the ability to run
all tests. There are only four NYSE listed railroads all of which report income
statements and balance sheets. This resulted in an inability to run tests sepa-
rately for railroads when the NYSE only sample is used.
TABLE 6
Stock Market Listing Requirements: Total Area of
Balance Sheet (Mann-Whitney Test)
Listed vs Unlisted
Listed median 114
Unlisted median 18
p-value 0.00***
P-value is two-sided.
** 5% significance
*** 1% significance
Taken together, the results reported here indicate that vari-
ous forms of regulation motivated the management of compa-
nies to disclose income statements and, to a lesser extent, bal-
ance sheets, in the early part of the 20th century. Regulatory
effects were an important force in encouraging companies to
provide adequate disclosure. The results indicate that these
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regulatory measures helped bring about more complete and
consistent financial reporting.
A limitation of this study is that the results cannot be gener-
alized to other periods where different pressures existed on re-
porting. Neither can the results be generalized to companies
operating in other countries where regulatory pressures were
different. For instance, currently the SEC regulations would
dominate those of rate regulation. Likewise, Boockholdt [1978]
notes that rate regulation was not aggressively pursued during
World War I. Thus, the effect of rate regulation on statement
disclosure may not be detected during that period because of
poor enforcement. The paper also fails to consider other forces
that may have acted as regulatory influences.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This study has examined the effect of rate regulation and
stock market listing requirements on the frequency and size of
income statement and balance sheet disclosures by companies
in the 1915 Moody’s Analyses of Investments. The results strongly
support the hypotheses that both types of regulation influenced
reporting. Thus, regulatory pressures influenced company re-
porting practices and helped to move company reporting to a
more complete and consistent model.
Rate regulation laws required regulated industries to pro-
vide income statements to regulators. This study hypothesized
that rate regulated companies would be more likely to publicly
report income statements because they were already provided
for the regulators. The results, with respect to rate regulation,
showed that utilities were more likely than industrials to report
income and that the income statement disclosures were larger
for utilities than those for industrials. The analysis also showed
that both railroads and utilities were more likely to disclose
revenues than industrial companies. Industrials, however, were
more likely to disclose a balance sheet and have more compre-
hensive balance sheet disclosure.
Stock exchanges impose listing requirements on companies
choosing to list on the exchange. These regulations are essen-
tially voluntarily entered into rather than imposed by law; but,
nonetheless, these regulations are hypothesized to influence
statement disclosures. The NYSE required the reporting of both
an income statement and balance sheet by 1915. Unlisted com-
panies did not face this requirement. Therefore, stock market
listing would increase the likelihood of reporting both income
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statements and balance sheets. The NYSE also required disclo-
sure of all material items. This requirement would tend to in-
crease the size of financial statements. The results of this study
supported these hypotheses. Listed companies were more likely
to report income statements, although this effect was only sig-
nificant for industrial companies when examined by industry.
Also, the likelihood of disclosing a balance sheet increased when
a company traded on an exchange. The size of both statements
also increased among listed companies relative to unlisted com-
panies.
These results provide empirical support to the literature
that discusses the leading role of regulated industries in report-
ing income [Boockholdt, 1978; Bryer, 1993]. The most surpris-
ing result was the infrequency of U.S. firms to disclose a balance
sheet in 1915. This finding is inconsistent with the assertion in
the literature that almost all firms published a balance sheet
[Brief, 1987] and that it was the only necessary statement
[Gilman, 1939; Skinner, 1987; Kendig, 1993]. The results re-
ported here indicate that regulation was a significant influence
on the reporting of income by companies in the early 20th cen-
tury. Greater detail in the income statement was also a by-prod-
uct of regulation. The format of rate-regulated company income
statements was generally consistent across firms, using a single-
step presentation. In contrast, industrial firm income statements
lacked a consistent format and often omitted important disclo-
sures (such as revenue). Thus, rate regulation also had an im-
pact on the format and content of income statement disclosures.
Regulation was a significant force in the evolution of finan-
cial statement disclosure at the turn of the 20th century. Utility
companies seemed to be the leaders in financial disclosure. They
were the most likely to provide an income statement. This in-
come statement almost always provided details about revenue
and operating expenses. The majority of utilities also reported a
balance sheet. The balance sheets were not standardized. The
biggest contribution of early 20th century rate regulation on
accounting was in encouraging a consistently formatted, de-
tailed income statement that was subsequently made available
for investors to use in financial statement analysis.
The stock exchange listing requirements were shown to only
be associated with increased income statement reporting for in-
dustrials, which were not rate-regulated. Thus, the stock ex-
change listing requirements played a major role in encouraging
these companies to report income. The stock market listing
requirements also resulted in more frequent balance sheet
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disclosures for all types of companies. This was the only regula-
tion that required balance sheets. Therefore, the stock exchange
listing requirements were a key regulatory influence in encour-
aging complete financial statement disclosure.
The results of this study also call into question the conclu-
sion by some previous authors that the income statement did
not become a consistent, prominent, and useful disclosure until
after 1920 [Skinner, 1987; Buckmaster and Jones, 1997]. The
income statement was more commonly disclosed than the bal-
ance sheet by the entire sample considered in the current study.
Analysts used income statement information to provide advice
to investors [Moody, 1915]. In fact, since ratings would not be
provided without an income statement, it was viewed by Moody
as a necessary statement. Regulation played an important role
in bringing income statement information to the status of use-
fulness before 1920.
The impact of regulation on the format of the income state-
ment is also very evident. Rate-regulated company statements
followed a consistent and informative format, disclosing rev-
enues and operating expenses. Without this regulatory pressure,
industrial statements lacked consistency as well as detail. Thus,
regulation played a very significant role in the growing promi-
nence and disclosure of income by American companies in the
early 20th century.
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